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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VAUGHN JUDD and ORA NELL JUDD, 
his wife, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
-vs-
KANAB CITY, A body politic and 
) 
) 
) 
) Case No. 18300 
corporate under the laws of the ) 
State of Utah; GAYLEN HOYT and 
JOLYNN HOYT his wife; and ORVIL ) 
ROBINSON and LULA ROBINSON, his 
wife, ) 
Defendants-Respondents ) 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from a consolidation of two 
district court actions. Plaintiff-Appellants, Vaughn Judd 
and Ora Nell Judd, his wife, brought suit against Kanab City 
and the four individuals seeking to quite title to certain 
real property and seeking an injunction against the 
Defendant-Respondents to enjoin the construction of a road 
on the real property. 
The other matter was a probate petition filed by 
the Defendant-Respondent Kanab City. The action sought the 
issuance of a Probate Judge's Deed to that same real 
property described in Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
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Plaintiffs protested the issuance of a probate 
deed to Kanab City. 
DISPOSITION BELOW 
The Court below, following consolidated trial, 
found in favor of Defendants and against Plaintiffs, ruling 
that the area in question was indeed a city street. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The statement of facts by Plaintiff-Appellants 
outlines the procedural matters leading to this position in 
the lawsuit but does not outline the facts and transactions 
prior to the filing of these cases. The following 
recitation of facts is consistent with the Findings made by 
the lower court. 
The trial court found that a plat located in the 
Off ice of Kane County Recorder showing the Kanab City area 
was not officially recorded but was actually used as an 
official Kanab City plat since "time irrunemorial." (Findings 
'1(8) The plat designated as streets those portions of real 
property sought by Plaintiffs. (Findings ~9) The disputed 
area had been used for gardens, plants and animal grazing 
and had never been officially opened as street or used as 
streets. (Findings '1[10 and 11) 
In spite of those somewhat inconsistent uses, 
"from time immemorial" the subject property has "been 
2 
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recognized by the public as portions of Third North Street 
and Fourth West Street belonging to Kanab City.'' {Findings 
~11) 
The Court found that there was no evidence that 
the Plaintiffs or their predecessors had occupied or used 
the disputed land prior to the entry of the Kanab townsite 
and that in fact the Plaintiffs and their predecessors had 
recognized the designation of the disputed area as city 
streets. {Findings ~12 and 15) No taxes had ever been 
assessed on the property platted as streets and no one 
{including the Plaintiffs) had ever paid taxes on that 
property. (Findings ~18) 
There was a (City Council) meeting on July 8, 
1975, at which Plaintiffs presented a petition requesting 
abandonment of the street area. The city council voted 
favorably, but there was total failure to comply with the 
requirements of Utah statutes and the effort for abandonment 
was of no effect. {Findings ~19) 
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ARGUMENT 
Defendant-Appellants are entitled to this Court's 
affirmance of the trial court's Judgment. Plaintiff-
Appellants have failed to challenge any of the lower court's 
findings, which are amply supported by the record. Without 
a challenge of these findings, the decision below is 
unimpeachable since its legal premises are sound. 
POINT I THE LOWER COURTS' DECISION IS ENTITLED 
TO PRESUMPTIONS OF VALIDITY 
Plaintiff-Appellants have appealed from the lower 
court's decision without challenging any of the factual 
determinations made. Further, no transcript of the trial is 
available to support any such challenge. 
Where no transcript of trial is available, the 
trial court's actions are presumed valid. Goodman v. 
Wilkinson, 629 P.2d 447 (Utah 1981), Estate of Thorley, 579 
P.2d 927 (Utah 1978). 
4 
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POINT II PLAINTIFFS HAVE NO CLAIM TO THE LAND 
UNDER THE FEDERAL TOWNSITE ACT 
The original site for Kanab City was designated 
pursuant to federal statutes enacted by the United States 
Congress in 1820 and 1867. The first law was entitled "An 
Act Making Further Provisions for the Sale of the Public 
Lands." The second was entitled "An Act for the Relief of 
the Inhabitants of Cities and Towns Upon the Public Lands," 
and is commonly known as the Federal Townsite Act. These 
laws together established the authority for a state or 
territory to prescribe rules and regulations whereby a 
townsite could be established and disposal made of public 
land. 
A portion of the Federal Townsite Act, 14 Stat. 
541, 43 U.S.C.A., §718, provides as follows: 
That whenever any portion of the public lands of 
the United States have been or shall be settled 
upon and occupied as a townsite, and therefore not 
subject to entry under the agricultural 
pre-emption laws, it shall be lawful, in case such 
town shall be incorporated, for the corporate 
authorities thereof, and if not incorporated, for 
the judge of the county court for the county in 
which such town may be situated, to enter at the 
proper land office, and at the minimum price, the 
land so settled and occupied, in trust for the 
several use and benefit of the occupants thereof, 
according to their respective interests; the 
execution of which trust, as to the disposal of 
the lots in such town, and the proceeds of the 
sales thereof, to be conducted under such rules 
and regulations as may be prescribed by the 
legislative authority of the State or Territory in 
which the same may be situated ... 
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The Federal Townsite Act was amended on June 8, 
1868, (15 Stat. 67), so as to require not only the payment 
of the minimum price for such lands but also the costs of 
surveying. 
The Territorial Legislature of Utah, as 
authorized, enacted on February 17, 1869, an act known as 
the Territorial Townsite Act. C.L. Utah 1867, §1166 e~. seq. 
The substance of the Territorial Townsite Act is still 
retained in Utah law and is presently found at Section 
57-7-1 et. seq., Utah Code Ann. (1953), as amended. 
Section 57-7-1 provides that when the District 
Judge (formerly the Probat~ Judge) entered at the proper 
land office the land occupied and settled as a city or town 
it was his duty "to dispose of and convey the title to such 
land, or to the several blocks, lots, parcels or shares 
thereof, to the persons entitled thereto," as determined by 
law. 
The Territorial Townsite Act further provided that 
after entry of the land public notice was to be given, and 
within six (6) months after the first publication, every 
person claiming any lot or parcel of land within the land 
entered was required to specify in writing, giving an 
accurate description of the land claimed, all property he 
claimed to be entitled to receive [Sections 57-7-2, 3 Utah 
Code Annotated (1953)]. Section 57-7-3 further provides 
6 
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that any person failing to make and deliver to the Clerk of 
the Court his claim within the six {6) months provided by 
law would be "forever barred of the right of claiming or 
recovering such land, or any interest or estate therein or 
in any part thereof, in any court." The Court could, for 
good cause shown, extend the time for filing a claim, but 
not to exceed one (1) year from the date the notice was 
first published. 
Defendant's Exhibit 39 contains a copy of the 
Patent for the Kanab Townsite issued to William A. 
Bringhurst, County Judge in and for the County of Kane, Utah 
Territory, by Rutherford B. Hayes, President of the United 
States of America. This document was dated May 15, 1880, 
and was filed for record with the Kane County Recorder on 
March 7, 1889. A careful reading of the document indicates 
Judge Bringhurst had entered the land containing the Kanab 
Townsite with the General Land Office of the United States 
at Salt Lake City, Utah Territory, had made full payment 
therefore, and was entitled to the issuance of a patent for 
the Kanab Townsite. 
Inasmuch as no proof to the contrary was presented 
at trial it is conclusive that the statutory provisions for 
the disposal of the land within the Kanab Townsite were 
complied with, i.e. that within thirty (30) days after the 
entry of such lands public notice was given and all 
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claimants were given an opportunity to claim the land they 
were then occupying or in which they had any interest. 
The record is clear that Plaintiff-Appellants' 
predecessors in interest did not claim the land under the 
provisions of Section 57-7-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953). 
If the Plaintiff-Appellants' predecessors in 
interest did not claim the land then the land would have 
been disposed of as unclaimed land. The present provision 
for the disposal of unclaimed lands is contained in Section 
57-7-15, Utah Code Annotated (1953). However the language 
contained in the Territorial Townsite Act, which governed in 
1880, is more detailed and for that reason reference is made 
to that act. Section 1175 of the Territorial Townsite Act 
provided that if unclaimed lands remained after the 
expiration of time for filing claims then the Probate Judge 
was obligated to "cause the same to be surveyed and laid out 
into suitable blocks and lots, and shall reserve such 
portions as may be deemed necessary for public squares, 
school houses or hospital lots, and shall cause all 
necessary streets, roads, lanes and alleys to be laid out 
through the same, a plot of which, properly certified, shall 
be recorded in the recorder's office of the county in which 
the same may be situated" [emphasis added]. Section 1175 
further provided that the Probate Judge could then "sell the 
lots or blocks so laid out, and not reserved for public use 
8 
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in suitable parcels, to possessor[s] of adjoining lands or 
to other citizens of such city or town." 
The evidence received in the instant case 
indicates that the land in question was platted prior to 
be~ng occupied, that it was then sold to the Plaintiffs' 
predecessor in interest, and that the conveyance to the 
Plaintiffs predecessor did not contain the real property 
that had been previously platted as public streets. 
Plaintiffs Have No Pre-Townsite Claim 
Defendants Exhibits 27, 30, 31 and 39 show that no 
claim was made by Plaintiff-Appellants predecessors to 
having rights prior to the townsite plat. In fact, the 
minutes for the Probate Court's proceedings of April 8, 
1892 show Plaintiffs predecessor, Joseph G. Brown, appeared 
and took action inconsistent with any claim of prior right. 
The minutes reflect that Mr. Brown presented a 
deed to the Court which had been issued to him by Kane 
County and which contained an error both as to the location 
of and the amount of the real property. According to the 
minutes Mr. Brown claimed that he was only entitled to 15 
acres rather than 23 acres and 6 rods. He asked that his 
deed be corrected and the proper amount of land be given to 
him. In conformity with his request the Court ordered the 
9 
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preparation of the new deed conveying to Mr. Brown the 
following described lots in accordance with a survey that 
had been recently made: 
"Lots 3 & 4 in B. 56·. Lots 3 and 4 in B. 57 in Plat 
A. Lots 1-2-3-4 in B. 7. Lots 1-2-3-4 in B.8 
Plat C, comprised in the Sl/2 of Sec. 21, and 
within the Corporate limits as platted in the 
Recorders (sic) Office." 
No mention is made of the property comprising the 
streets of Fourth West and Third North. Had those streets 
been omitted by error, Mr. Brown would have had the 
opportunity to once again return to the Court to have the 
error corrected. He obviously know the p~ocedure to correct 
an error. 
The probate minutes clearly indicate that the 
hearing concerned the title to lands within the corporate 
limits of Kanab that had been "advertised and platted by the 
Probate Judge." The fact that the lands in question had 
been platted is very important to the determination of the 
issues before this Court. There would have been no need to 
plat the property had Mr. Brown been an original claimant 
under the Territorial Townsite Act. All he would have had 
to do was file his written claim in compliance with the 
statutory guidelines and he would have been entitled to all 
of the property which he was occupying or possessing at the 
time the Kanab Townsite was entered. This hearing was some 
10 
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twelve years after the issuance of the patent, and some 
three years after the patent was recorded. The statutory 
time period for filing an original claim had long since 
lapsed. 
Pertinent Case Law 
The two leading Utah cases which construe the 
Townsite Act and the provisions of Section 57-7-1 et seq. 
are Hall v. North Ogden City, 109 Utah 325, 175 P.2d 703 
(1946) and Cox v. Carlisle, 11 Utah 2d 372, 359 P.2d 1049 
(1961). 
Plaintiff-Appellants rely on the Hall case, but it 
is factually dissimilar. In the Hall case the Utah Supreme 
Court, on rehearing, held that where the Plaintiffs had 
shown that at and prior to the time the townsite was entered 
they or their predecessors in interest had occupied and used 
the land and had continued to so occupy it until the filing 
of the action that they had obtained "an equitable ownership 
in the property which [they were] occupying at the time of 
the entry, [and] that such ownership became a vested right 
when the lands were entered in the land office." In each of 
the cases relied on as precedent in the Hall opinion the 
fact situations were such that each claimant could show 
evidence to the effect that either they or their 
11 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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predecessors in interest were the occupants of the land in 
question at the time the entry of the townsite was made. 
In the Cox case, the Plaintiff-citizen appealed 
from judgment in favor of the Defendant city. The city was 
adjudged owner of the street. Significant in the Courts 
reasoning was a distinction between Cox and Hall: 
No evidence of occupancy of the street by 
plaintiff and her predecessors, at the time of the 
deeds, the Townsite Entry of the petition for 
confirmation, is reflected in the record. 
Therefore, Hall v. North Ogden City, upon which 
plaintiff so heavily leans, seems uncontrolling. 
11 Utah 2d at 372. 
The same facts are in evidence here, and the trial court 
should likewise be affirmed. 
The present case can be distinguished from the 
£acts of the Hall case and those cases ref erred to in the 
Hall opinion. The trial court found there was no testimony 
nor documentary evidence showing the occupancy of the land 
in question prior to or at the time the Kanab Townsite was 
entered with the Land Office in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Wesley Theo McAllister, who was called as a 
witness by the Plaintiffs, testified that he was born in 
1905 and that he had a memory of events that transpired in 
1910. This is thirty years after the patent for the City of 
Kanab was issued to the Probate Judge. It is twenty-one 
years after the patent was recorded and became public 
record. On cross-examination Mr. McAllister testified that 
the property in question was not occupied until his 
12 
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grandfather obtained it and that he did not know whether his 
grandfather "had ever even grew anything." The Plaintiffs, 
whose burden it is to show occupancy by themselves or their 
predecessors in interest both before and at the time of the 
Townsite Entry, showed none. Not only did the Plaintiffs 
fail to show such proof but the evidence received by the 
Court would indicate that the contrary was the case, i.e. 
that the Plaintiffs-Appellants' predecessors in interest did 
not in fact occupy the property in question prior to or at 
the time of entry but were not occupants of said property 
until after the townsite had been entered and the unclaimed 
land had been platted, advertised and sold. 
It is the Defendants-Respondents' position that 
the Cox case is controlling on the facts of the case now 
before this Court. A careful analysis of the facts of that 
case reveals the following similarities: 
1. In the Cox case at the time the Plaintiff's 
predecessors obtained confirmation of title from the Probate 
Court they asserted no claim as to title to or occupancy of 
any part of the platted street. Likewise in the present 
case at the time Joseph G. Brown obtained a corrected 
confirmation of his title from the Probate Court he asserted 
no claim as to title to or occupancy of any part of either 
Third North Street of Fourth West Street. 
2. In Cox there was no evidence of occupancy of 
the street by the Plaintiff or her predecessors, "at the 
13 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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time of the deeds, the Townsite Entry or the petition for 
confirmation." It was for this reason and this reason alone 
that the Court distinguished the Cox case from the Hall case 
and found that holding as not controlling. Likewise in the 
case at bar there was no evidence presented of occupancy at 
the time of the Townsite Entry, or at the issuance of the 
deed or when Mr. Brown's petition for confirmation or a 
corrected deed was heard. 
3. In both Cox and the present case there was no 
showing that taxes had ever been paid on the platted roads; 
likewise neither Manti City nor Kanab City had ever claimed 
of anyone taxes on the roads in question. 
4. In both cases some ninety years had elapsed 
before the Plaintiffs challenged the ownership of the 
platted streets in the municipalities. 
In sununary, the Plaintiffs-Appellants, whose 
burden it was to show occupancy by them or their 
predecessors before and at the time of the Townsite Entry, 
showed none. Thus, Hall is not controlling and the 
application of the Cox holding would require the Court to 
affirm the trial court. 
14 
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POINT III KANAB CITY HAS NOT ABANDONED FOURTH WEST 
STREET 
Appellants claim the action of the Kanab City 
Council on July 8, 1975, was sufficient to constitute an 
abandonment of the street. Plaintiffs' Exhibit 6 indicates 
that in that City Council meeting, the Plaintiffs' petition 
requesting the City to abandon Fourth West Street, was read 
and considered. After some discussion a motion was made, 
seconded and passed to abandon the street. No further 
action was taken. 
The statutory procedure for a city to abandon or 
vacate a street is set forth in Utah Code Annotated §10-8-8 
et. seq. A brief review of the procedure will show that the 
attempt of July 8, 1975, to abandon Fourth West Street was 
void for failure to comply with the law. 
Section 10-8-8.1 establishes in detail the 
procedure that must be followed for a city council to 
consider a petition to vacate a road or street as follows: 
On petition by a person owning a lot in a city, 
praying that a street ..• in the immediate vicinity 
of such lot may be vacated, ... the governing body 
of such city, upon hearing, and upon being 
satisfied that there is good cause for 
such ... vacation ... , that it will not be 
detrimental to the general interest, and that it 
should be made, may declare by ordinance such 
street ... vacated ... [emphasis added] 
Section 10-8-8.3 requires that notice of the city 
council's intention to vacate a street, or any part thereof, 
be given, except where the council has obtained the written 
15 Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
consent to such vacation from all of the owners of property 
abutting the street to be vacated. Section 10-8-8.4 
provides the type of notice to be given as follows: 
No street .•. shall be so vacated, unless notice of 
the pendency of the petition and prayer thereof, 
and the date of the hearing therein, is such 
petition is filed, ••• be given by publishing in a 
newspaper published or of general circulation in 
such city once a week for four consecutive weeks 
preceding action on such petition ... , and by 
mailing such notice to all owners of record of 
land abutting the street ••. proposed to be vacated 
addressed to the mailing addresses appearing on 
the rolls of the county assessor of the county 
wherein said land is located. Action thereon 
shall take place within three months after the 
completion of notice. 
Further, without the requisite notice, the meeting 
of July 8, 1975, could not qualify as the required hearing. 
Finally, no ordinance was passed. There was merely a 
motion. The requisite findings of public benefit were not 
made. 
Kanab City failed to comply with the following 
statutory requirements in its attempt to abandon Fourth West 
Street: 
1. No ordinance was adopted 
2. No hearing was held. 
3. Proper notice was not given. 
4. Statutorily required findings were not made. 
The effect of the deficiencies of the July 8, 1975 
meeting is clearly stated in Utah Code Annotated Section 
10-8-8.4 "no street ... shall be so vacated, unless notice .•. , 
and the date of the hearing ... be given •.• " 
16 
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Without even considering the legality of the 
manner in which the City Council attempted to abandon the 
street, we note from the evidence received by the trial 
Court that on at least nine other occasions after the 
meeting of July 8, 1975, the City Council discussed Fourth 
West Street and on none of those occasions did they 
acknowledge the fact they considered the street abandoned. 
In fact, in the majority of those discussions the City 
Council asserted its ownership or control over the street 
and persisted with the notion of opening the street to the 
public. See Plaintiffs' Exhibits 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 
14, and 15. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the judgment of 
DATED this 
be _!b~irrned in all respects. 
____ ,_Sf'_) day of w~~ 1982. 
the lower court should 
Snow & Nuffer 
A Professional Corporation 
F. KIRK HEATON 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the t~ day of 
QC..To!&~ , 1982, I served two copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF, on H. Delbert Welker, by depositing a copy in the 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
H. Delbert Welker 
2567 Filmore Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
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